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Introduction
In September 2015, the British magazine The Economist released 
an article that questioned differences in development patterns, even inter-
nal ones, among emerging economies such as Mexico, Brazil, Russia and 
South Africa. It recommended that, besides making the right choice for 
macroeconomic policies, they should take into consideration factors such as 
security of contracts, high-quality public services and transparent budgets to 
be trustworthy to economic agents4; in other words, it was necessary building 
institutions the population could trust in.
Although advocating for the institutionalist perspective of economic 
development is nothing new5, the idea that "good institutions" and "good 
governance" were necessary to promote development has gained prominence 
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in the political and economic debate in the late 20th century, in convergence 
with neoclassical propositions and with the discourse of multilateral organi-
zations. Based on the agenda for developing countries, "good institutions" 
and "good governance" are synonymous with greater protection of property 
rights, independent central banks focused on stabilization policies, trans-
parent corporate governance, among others prescriptions crystallized in the 
Washington Consensus, which are translated into greater economic liberal-
ization and market deregulation. The acceptance of these recommendations 
did not happen in a historical vacuum.
For some countries, this change went against social formations that 
had already presented structural cracks. It was the case of South Africa, 
which not only spent much of the 20th century dealing with a primary-export 
economy that depended on foreign capital from multinational corporations 
(Marais 2011), but was also ruled by an authoritarian and segregationist polit-
ical regime. After years of political struggle by liberation movements, led by 
the African National Congress (ANC), the democratic transition started in 
mid-1990s and met the diffusion of new development conventions: multi-
lateral institutions and developed countries started recommending a series 
of institutional and governance reforms combined to policies focused on 
eradicating poverty mainly for African countries. Therefore, since the 1990s, 
South Africa has been a special example of drastic institutional transition, 
economic and political change occurring at the same time.
This work aims to present a critical analysis of the impacts on the 
diffusion of new international institutional and governance standards in the 
economic development of South Africa (in its broad sense). The study was 
divided into four sections, besides the introduction and the final consider-
ations. The second section addresses the association between institutions 
and economic development in recent academic literature. The third section 
presents the methodology applied to assess the development of democracy, 
private and intellectual property rights, financial institutions, tariffs and 
commercial protection in the country, as well as of welfare and labor pro-
tection institutions. The fourth section briefly addresses the South African 
democratic transition period back in the 1990s, highlighting its institutional 
and political shift towards a neoliberal model capable of favoring monetary 
stability and "big business", despite the chronic inequalities yet observed in 
the country nowadays. The fifth section makes an in-depth analysis of each 
of these institutions in the South African context and investigates the extent 
to which they have resulted in economic growth, reduced inequalities and 
have enabled better quality of life for the South African population. It was 
possible concluding that the association between institutions and economic 
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development is more complex than the one presumed by many economists 
and international organisms, since it does not present a simple and lin-
ear correlation. Moreover, it was observed that developing countries need 
to implement structural transformations that are beyond the sole power of 
market mechanisms. 
Institutions and economic development:  
from the New Institutional Economics  
to the critical view of Ha-Joon Chang
The interest in bringing institutions to the core of the debate about 
economic development has gotten significant contribution from the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) in recent decades, mainly since the 1990s. 
According to authors who follow the "new institutionalism orthodoxy" (Cas-
tellano 2012), there would be a series of historical evidence capable of prov-
ing the association between institutions and economic development. These 
researchers interpret the progress of nations as a process deriving from 
basic economic development forces observed in decentralized relations of 
market institutions. Thus, NIE discourse is crystallized by the logo "institu-
tions matter" (Tylecote 2016) for development purposes, which highlights 
the direct relationship established between the institutional framework of 
a given country and its economic growth variables (Acemoglu and Robin-
son, in "Por que as nações fracassam: as origens do poder, da prosperidade e da 
pobreza" [2012]; North, Wallis and Weingast, "Violence and Social Orders: A 
Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History" [2009]; 
Tylecote 2016; Zanden 2009).
The term New Institutional Economics was introduced by Ameri-
can economist Oliver Williamson (1975). According to Richter (2005), two 
branches of the New Institutional Economics have developed from the pio-
neering works conducted by Ronald Coase (1937; 1960) namely: Transaction 
Cost Economics (Williamson 1985); and New Institutional Economics of 
History (North 1986). According to North (1990), who won the Nobel Prize 
in Economics, institutions arise from uncertainty and from the need of over-
coming transaction costs, for instance, the costs of establishing, monitoring 
and controlling agents' relations in market-failure environments6.
Most studies based on this tradition (North 1971; 1981; 1990; Lan-
des 1998; Zanden 2009; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005, 2012; 
6 Cf. (Coase 1937); (Williamson 1979); (North  1986; 1990); (Gala 2003). 
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Bates 1981, 1997; Bates, Coatsworth and Willianson 2007) have inferred that, 
nowadays' developing countries are those that somehow still have under-
mined institutions that favored free competition and smooth Market func-
tioning. This interpretation features developing countries as the ones that 
have adopted institutional arrangements that reduce productivity, destabilize 
contracts and create a property right-insecurity environment. This "vicious 
path" (North 1990; Medeiros 2001) would have been the one followed by the 
Spanish colonies in Latin America, and its solidification would be the reason 
why their economic development is permanently blocked. On the other hand, 
the "virtuous" path taken by the current developed economies is featured by 
the Anglo-Saxon model of market economy.
Following North's tradition, economist Daron Acemoglu and political 
scientist James A. Robinson, both in Institutions as the fundamental cause of 
long-run growth (2005) and in Why Nations Fail (2012), have defined institu-
tions as rules for human game-shaping interactions. According to Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2005), economic institutions are important because 
they influence the structure of incentives available in a given society, as well 
as help allocating resources in order to be more efficiently used. In addition, 
these authors have shown how institutional differences are determining 
aspects for divergences observed in prosperity levels between countries col-
onized by Spain and England. If on the one hand, theories by Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001; 2002; 2005) rejected geographic and cultural 
explanations for the success, or failure, of nations, on the other hand, they 
have put their hopes for development in institutions that encouraged free 
markets, as well as in the private sector. 
Since the late 20th century, the aforementioned concept has been 
adopted as mainstream discourse, which echoes on the agendas of inter-
national organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Governance reforms 
and market-oriented institutional changes are seen as essential to promote 
economic development. Institutionally strong states — i.e., who are capable 
of guaranteeing security and the rule of law for the largest number of indi-
viduals possible, but, above all, who are capable of guaranteeing property 
rights — are also essential (Bates, Coatsworth e Willianson 2007; Buchanan 
2008; Boettke and Fink 2011; Dhonte and Kapur 1996; Glaeser et al. 2004; 
La Porta et al. 1999; Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999).
It is possible to find an alternative approach to the theoretical asso-
ciation established between institutions and economic development, as well 
as in the greater framework of trust in the markets as economic growth 
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and development drivers. According to Chang (2011), NIE has two main 
theoretical issues, the first one lies on causality, according to which, NIE 
sees association between institutions and economic development as a linear 
process that goes from institutions to economic development. The second 
issue refers to the linear, static and simplistic ways often substantiating the 
understanding about this association (Chang 2007; 2011). Such an under-
standing ends up leading to the assumption of the existence of a universal 
model of "good economic and political institutions", as well as to the belief 
that such models could be extrapolated to other countries, based on the expe-
rience of powerful Western countries (Castellano 2012; Evans 2004; 2010; 
Portes 2007; Przeworski 2004).
Chang's (2011) main criticism to the mainstream discourse about 
institutions lies in the fact that it describes the association between institu-
tions and economic development in a simplistic, linear and static manner. 
Institutional changing processes that advocate for the market are often recom-
mended to developing countries without taking into account several aspects 
("one-size-fits-all" model) likely involved in these processes that do not follow 
closed models (Chang 2004). Moreover, Chang (2004) criticizes the excessive 
focus on private property rights. Although economies without any property 
rights protection, where uncertainty almost permanently prevails, are clearly 
not the best environment for development, there is a belief in property rights 
as a "good-in-itself" institution (Chang 2004, 144).
Some methodological aspects:  
Institutionalist analysis of a developing economy
The idea that a "package of good institutions" (Chang 2004) would 
be essential to enable economic growth  (Aron 2001; Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton 1999); as well as that the development history of advanced 
countries would be marked by the application and evolution of this group of 
institutions (Bates, Coatsworth e Williamson 2007; North 1990; Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2012), has gained room in the economic discourse since the 
late 20th century.
However, applying this institutionalist approach to better understand 
the economic development of a country facing severe economic and social 
issues is a great challenge, since many institutional changes undergone by 
this country are so recent that most statistical data or censuses about spe-
cific institutions, or specific analyses, may not yet be available. Therefore, 
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analyzing institutional changes in South Africa, as evident as some of them 
may be, leads to some challenges.
The first challenge refers to the application of a traditional institution-
alist perspective to favor historical treatment and its effects on the economic 
development of a given society — path dependence —, within the South 
African context. Although the analysis to be conducted aims at covering the 
democratic years of the new South Africa after the end of apartheid, one can-
not deny the effects of this regime on, and the roots it left in, the development 
of South African capitalism. The short time series covering this analysis will 
be compensated by the comprehensive analysis of the institutions.
Thus, the hypothesis raised in this work is that adapting to the "good 
institution" models did not necessarily result in economic development, or 
even in greater economic growth, in the post-apartheid South Africa. This 
study has also presented how, in some aspects, the country has shown bet-
ter performance in institutional indicators than some developed countries, 
although it did not improve the quality of life of its population or reduced 
its deep inequalities.
The institutions analyzed in the next section were the ones mostly 
defended by the mainstream institutionalist discourse and by NIE as essen-
tial to enable economic development — the so-called "good global standard 
institutions"7. The herein analyzed institutions were democracy (universal 
suffrage and worldwide governance indicators such as voice and accountabil-
ity, rule of law, political stability), property rights (mainly intellectual property 
rights), financial institutions (banking system, central bank), commercial 
tariffs (trade opening level) and social and labor protection institutions. Fur-
thermore, the timeline of analysis has privileged the decades following the 
South African democratic transition, when several institutional changes and 
reforms took place based on the neoliberal approach (1994-2014). However, 
it has also outlined the history of these institutions in case their origin dated 
back to times prior to the assessed one.
Democratic transition and neoliberalism in South Africa: 
(mis)guided paths of post-apartheid
Although the South African apartheid regime was only institutionally 
formalized in 1948 by the Afrikaans National Party, the roots of segregation 
observed in it date back to the 19th century. The social panorama by 1910 
7 "Global Standard Institutions (GSI)", Chang (2011). 
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encompassed a great majority of black individuals (who were the labor force 
to be exploited and did not have political rights) and the white minority 
who had voting rights (Fonseca-Satter 2011). In the meantime, several laws 
and acts have been enacted and evidenced the segregationist nature of the 
country's economic and political elites and a state capitalism type emerged 
in South Africa that allowed the country to grow fast (Fonseca-Satter 2011; 
Pereira 2010).
The transition to a democratic regime in South Africa started in 1994; 
this time meets the period marked by the international neoliberal agenda 
driven by the end of the Cold War and by globalization. Indeed, despite the 
legacy of apartheid, mainly the profound social and racial inequality in the 
country, the South African economic policy has embraced a conservative 
marked-oriented program instead of making deep structural repairs. The 
abandonment of a more critical stance by the ANC represented, in its turn, 
a true "elite pact", since the ANC elite organized the elections, whereas the 
white elite managed to maintain their interests and economic privileges 
(Bond 2000; Taylor 2016).
This "transition of elites" (Bond 2000, 16), which has validated an 
economic policy that prioritized private initiative and property rights, was 
added to the GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) governmental 
plan from 1997. However, it did not happen overnight, but resulted from a 
process whose origins date back to the 1980s. Part of this process is linked 
to the involvement of Thabo Mbeki (who would become the country's future 
president) with the South African business elite and with international finan-
cial institutions such as Goldman Sachs (Segatti and Pons-Vignon 2013).  
The economic policy adopted by the South African post-apartheid gov-
ernment was summarized in three main dimensions: European approach to 
social policy, along with the fear of risks of personal dependence on the state, 
in association with the East Asian approach to economic growth — based 
on conservative macroeconomic parameters (Hirsch 2005). However, these 
changes in South Africa's institutional settings during the post-apartheid years 
did not necessarily result in better economic performance. The average GDP 
per capita annual growth rate in South Africa declined from approximately 
1,9% per year, in 1960-1980, to approximately 1,5% per year, in 1994-2014, 
or even 0,3% per year, if we consider the period 1980-2014 (Graph 1). "Good 
institutions" alone do not deliver economic development, as the study will 
show in the next sections.
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Graph 1: South Africa GDP per capita growth (annual %)
Source: World Bank Data. 
Institutions and economic development  
in post-apartheid South Africa
The South African democratization process took place at a time when 
the role played by institutions gained importance in political and economic 
debates. Several analysts, mostly the ones from multilateral organizations 
such as World Bank and IMF, have started interpreting the crises and struc-
tural issues of developing economies as institutional and governance issues 
(Aron 2001; Fallon and Pereira de Silva 1994; Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lo-
baton 1999; Riley 1995; IMF 2000). International recommendations, mainly 
the ones regarding African countries, have headed towards the implemen-
tation of a package of good institutions and focused on reducing poverty, as 
well as on improving education and health (Blackden 1999; Christiaensen, 
Demery and Paternostro 2002; Coudouel, Dani and Paternostro 2006; Marc, 
Graham and Schacter 1994; World Bank 1996). The next subsections analyze 
South African institutional development in light of this debate, as well as to 
what extent compliance with NIE discourse models has contributed to the 
economic development of the country. 
Democracy 
Although successful, the South African transition into an institution-
ally democratic regime only took place after a long process marked by violence 
and repression. However, it did not change the significant socioeconomic 
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inequality between the white minority and the black majority in the country 
(Bond 2000; 2004; Holdt 2013). Universal suffrage was established in the 
country in 1994, after the country's first multiracial election, which brought 
Nelson Mandela to power. The democratic constitution approved in Decem-
ber 1996 was considered one of the most progressive constitutions in the 
world, since it set clear parameters for human rights, freedom of expression, 
religion and equal rights. 
According to defenders of "good governance", South Africa has 
accomplished significant advancements in some of the indicators necessary 
to build democracy since the promulgation of its first democratic constitution. 
Such indicators, such as "voice and accountability", "rule of law", "political sta-
bility", among others, are components of the World Bank Group's Worldwide 
Governance Indicators proposed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 
(1999). These indicators reflect to which extent citizens of a given country are 
able to pick their government and collect their rights. They also measure the 
perception of trust in the law and in rules of society, as well as the likelihood 
of having their government destabilized by unconstitutional trends. 
Graph 2 shows the position of South Africa (based on percentile) in 
these indicators: 0 is the lowest position and, therefore, reflects the worst 
performance in this indicator, whereas 100 is the best performance. Overall, 
South Africa presents a relatively good position in these aspects, mainly in 
relation to the "rule of law" — which rose from the 55th percentile to approx-
imately 59th in 2010, as well as to the 64th percentile, in 2014. Although 
"Voice and Accountability" presented a downward trend since 2004, as well as 
worse position in 2010 than in 1996 (approximately 67th and 73rd percentile, 
respectively), its rank remained above the average of upper-middle income 
countries, and higher than that of other African countries — it ranked the 
68th percentile in 2014.  
With respect to "political stability and violence", the South African 
rank is below the average of upper-middle income countries, although it 
showed progress and approached this average from 2006 on. Similarly, Loo-
ney (2014) has compared these very same South African indicators to those 
of "emerging economies" such as Mexico, Malaysia, Turkey and Indonesia. 
South Africa presented better performance than each of these countries, on 
average. This outcome highlights the political gains acquired by the country, 
as well as its relative high governance levels over the years.
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Graph 2: Governance Indicators, South Africa and mean  
of upper-middle income countries, 1996-2014
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank. 
The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)8 was another indi-
cator capable of evidencing South Africa's progress on democracy. This index 
measures the performance of institutions in African countries in comparison 
to governance, which, in its turn, is defined as "the provision of political, 
economic and social assets citizens have the right to expect from their respec-
tive states"9. It comprises categories such as "Security and the Rule of Law", 
"Participation and Human Rights", "Sustainable Economic Opportunities 
and Human Development", which, in their turn, comprise other subcatego-
ries. Nowadays, South Africa ranks the seventh position in the ranking of 
54 African countries; its governance performance is well above the African 
average (Graph 2), mainly in subcategories such as "legitimacy of electoral 
processes" and "holding free and fair elections". 
However, the outcome of these indicators presents some paradoxes 
that make the analysis of the association between democracy and economic 
development even more complex. This association in the South African case 
elicits some contradictions that test the supposedly linear and inseparable 
view between democracy and economic development. 
8 The time series updated for this index starts in 2008. 
9 See http://iiag.online/
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Per capita income in South Africa when the universal suffrage was 
instituted for the 1994 elections (consolidated by the 1996 Constitution) was 
$3,445.2310. It was well above that of other African countries that had enacted 
universal suffrage decades earlier. On the other hand, South Africa per capita 
income faced a downward trend from its democratic transition until 2002 — 
it reached US$ 2,502.277. Thus, although one cannot deny the advancements 
achieved by South Africa through democracy introduction in the country, 
mainly in the form of universal suffrage and political rights of citizens, it is 
not possible to establish a simplistic and linear association between variables 
featuring liberal democracy and economic growth. Democracy is more than 
a "requirement" for growth; it is part of a larger historical process of social 
transformation (Alence 2009).
Graph 3: Ibrahim Index of African Governance in South Africa  
and the average for the African continent, 2008-2014
Source: IIAG Data Portal
Property rights 
The protection of property rights occupies central place among insti-
tutions addressed in the neoliberal institutionalist discourse as essential for 
economic development. Property right regimes are seen as essential tools 
10 World Bank data, in current dollars.
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to encourage investment, work and, therefore, economic growth (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2005; 2012; Aron 2001; Clague et al. 1996; Soto 2000; Knack 
and Keefer 1995; Gala 2003; North 1990; Tylecote 2016).
The 1978 Patent Act was the first patent law enacted in South Africa; 
it addressed the registration and granting of patents associated with commer-
cial, industrial or agricultural activities. The Copyright Act (1978) was also 
drafted in that very same year. Most of the content in these laws, as well as 
that of previous laws associated with the protection of intellectual property 
rights — such as the 1967 Performer's Protection Act —, was revised in the 
1997 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act. The introduction and revi-
sion of these laws have been increasingly influenced in order to comply with 
the standard of an international regime for intellectual property rights. South 
Africa became a member of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in 1999; 
this treaty aims at protecting patent rights for inventions simultaneously 
developed in different countries, based on the application of an international 
patent. It is important emphasizing that even before the official patent law 
was enacted in South Africa, the country was already a member of the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property since 1947. In addition, 
the country has joined the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
Convention in 1975. 
According to WIPO, South Africa has granted the total number of 
5,748 patents through its official office, between residents and non-residents, 
in the year it drafted its first Patent Law, whereas 6,817 patents were granted 
in the following year (1979). The number of patents granted to South African 
residents has decreased since its transition to democracy in 1994 — from 942 
(in 1994) to 140 (in 1999). The number of granted patents has increased and 
stabilized since the 2000s; 822 patents were granted to South African resi-
dents in 2010, although this number was still smaller than the one recorded 
in 1994. This number has decreased again by 2015, when 453 patents were 
granted to South African residents11.  
Patent granting to non-residents has shown an upward trend in 
1994 (n = 3,889) and 1998 (n = 6,663); then, there was a sharp decrease to 
1,858 patents granted in 2001. After 2004, the number of patents granted to 
non-residents was smaller than that granted to residents; this trend remained 
until 2009. It is possible seeing a paradox between the level of per capita 
income and the analyzed institution — in this case, intellectual property 
rights measured through patent granting. Per capita income in the year South 
Africa has instituted its Patent Law was US$ 1,722.227 and, despite small 
11 Direct patents and those held by PCT. 
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advancements, this level remained almost unchanged until the mid-1980s, 
when it recorded US$ 1,807.977 in 1985.
Graph 4: Total number of patents granted in South Africa, 1994-2014
Source: WIPO and World Bank. 
Although the country recorded peaks in patent granting at several 
points in the series, mainly in the mid-1990s (6,783 patents in 1996), the 
per capita income level has kept the decline rate at least until 2002, when it 
reached US$ 2,540.00 (current dollars). On the other hand, the level of per 
capita income increased from US$ 2,502.277 in 2002 to US$ 5,760.805 in 
2008, as the total number of granted patents tended to fall; it ranged from 
5,759 patents in 2003 to 1,742, in 2008. 
South Africa has presented excellent performance in recent decades 
in the protection of intellectual property rights, which is measured based 
on the International Property Rights Index (Table 1)12. This index measures 
three basic dimensions, namely: "legal and political environment", "protec-
tion of physical rights" and "protection of intellectual property rights". The 
last dimension is further divided into subcategories such as "protection of 
intellectual property rights", "protection of patent rights" and "copyright 
protection".
12 See https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/ 
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Table 1: Patent Right Protection Index (1960-2005)  
in developing countries
Countries 1960-1990 (average) 1995 2000 2005
South Africa 2.94 3.39 4.25 4.25
Brazil 1.22 1.48 3.59 3.59
China 1.33 2.12 3.09 4.08
India 1.03 1.23 2.27 3.76
Mexico 1.19 3.14 3.68 3.88
Nigeria 2.50 2.86 2.86 3.18
Russia - 3.48 3.68 3.68
Source: Park (2008).
Protection of property rights remains the main recommendation 
of the institutionalist discourse for the progress of developing economies. 
However, it is fallacious to think that this is a good thing in itself. It is not 
uncommon for the protection of intellectual property rights to oppose social 
justice promotion; thus, it is necessary taking into account the significant 
social effects resulting from restrictions imposed to technological progress 
in developing countries. The economic performance of developing countries 
that did not do so well in protecting patent rights was better than that of 
South Africa. The growth rate of South African annual per capita income, 
for example, was one of the lowest between 1994 and 2010 in comparison 
to other BRICS countries13.
Financial Institutions
The Central Bank of South Africa (South Africa Reserve Bank, SARB) 
was launched in 1921 based on the 1920 Currency and Banking Act. When 
it was created in 1921, the country became the fourth nation to establish a 
central bank outside Europe and the United Kingdom; the remaining three 
were the United States States, Japan and Java.
When it comes to political independence and autonomy, which are 
considered essential elements by the World Bank and the IMF, the South 
13 See Bond (2013) for the analysis of South African performance in the context of BRICS. 
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African central bank has a considerable level of autonomy to carry out its 
duties. According to the 1996 Constitution, "in pursuit of its primary object, 
[it] must perform its functions independently and without fear, favor or prej-
udice" (Republic of South Africa 1996). With respect to its ownership, at the 
time it was created, SARB followed most central banks around the world, 
which had most of their shareholders of private origin.
The regulation of the South African banking system is performed 
by SARB, based on the 1990 Banks Act and on the 1993 Mutual Banks Act. 
Nevertheless, there was gradual institutional development regarding the 
regulation of financial institutions. Since the late 20th century and early 21st 
century, South Africa has been implementing several institutional changes 
to meet the international standard. These market-oriented changes were 
implemented in the early 20th century, when the country already had a Central 
Bank established, even before other developed nations had it. However, it was 
unable to reach the level of economic growth it achieved in the 1960s-1980s. 
When it comes to the group of institutions in the financial sector, the cause 
and effect relations between institutions and South African economic devel-
opment become more paradoxical and often hard to identify14.
Tariffs and commercial opening level
South Africa was one of the founding countries of GATT (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) in 1948, when there was no differentiation 
between developed and developing countries within it. From 1960 on, when 
GATT allowed this differentiation to enable developing countries to get some 
type of specific treatment, the South African government opted to maintain 
the status of developed country within the agreement; in practical terms, it 
meant further and faster cuts to protectionist measures (Hirsch 2005). The 
period of the South African democratic transition was marked by the re-entry 
of its economy in the world stage, based on a fast trade liberalization process 
(Bhorat et al. 2013).
The fall of trade barriers was quite abrupt after democratization 
(Barbosa and Tepassê 2009). The Minister of Commerce and Industry 
from 1994 to 1996, Trevor Manuel, who were also Minister of Finance in 
1999, considered that inserting the South African economy into the world 
would be a challenging task, mainly due to the legacy of an economy that he 
considered non-competitive and protectionist (Hirsch 2005). South Africa 
14 When it established its legislation for the regulation of the banking sector, for example, the 
Banks Acts of 1990, South Africa already had a per capita income of approximately US $ 3,182.
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quickly became one of the developing countries with the highest degree of 
trade openness; it has even exceeded the tariff liberalization requirements 
demanded by the World Trade Organization since it became a member-coun-
try (Pons-Vignon and Segatti 2013) (Table 2).
Table 2: Mean tariffs on imports of manufactured products (%),  
developing countries, 1996-2010*
Countries 1996 2000 2006 2008 2010
South Africa** 19.8 9.0 8.3 7.4 6.9
Argentina 11.9 12.8 8.6 8.6 9.0
Brazil 13.4 14.7 9.8 10.5 10.7
China 21.7 16.2 8.6 8.2 7.6
Egypt - 23.8 14.1 10.0 9.4
Ethiopia - - 18.6 17.8 17.8
India 37.6 30.4 13.1 8.4 7.2
Russia 11.9 - - 9.4 6.5
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
* Applied consolidated rates. 
** Data from 1996 to 1999 refer to the South Africa Customs Union (SACU).
Economic integration took place, mainly in South Africa, after the 
years of isolation brought about by the apartheid regime, which turned foreign 
policies into a strategic element for the new government (Barbosa and Tepassê 
2009). Cooperation in Southern Africa Customs Unions (SACU), which 
was increasingly supported in versions presented by the European Union 
and multilateral institutions, represents the market modality established in 
the early 20th century; this modality aims at reducing customs tariffs and 
barriers to economic activities (Visentini 2010). Another initiative towards a 
free trade zone lies on the integration to the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) in 1994, which signed an agreement in 1998 to decrease 
tariff barriers for a 12-year period, in compliance with WTO standards — this 
process started in South Africa (Hirsch 2005). However, the drop in tariffs 
was not enough to provide a level of growth in per capita income comparable 
to that of previous decades, when mean tariff levels were much higher. The 
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mean growth rate of per capita income recorded for the 1960-1980 period 
was 2.3%, whereas the rate recorded for the 1994-2010 period was 1.4%15.
Social welfare and work protection institutions
The last point to be analyzed lies on the development of social welfare 
institutions and of those that regulate work in South Africa, with emphasis 
on the 1996 Constitution, which is considered one of the most progressive 
constitutions in the world. Institutions that "support the weaker segments 
of society have always been necessary to guarantee social stability" (Chang 
2004, 176; Polanyi 2000 [1944]). These mechanisms and institutions in 
South Africa were delayed for even longer by a regime that marched against 
History for decades. The institutional framework of apartheid has contributed 
to stifle levels of poverty, as well as to social and economic inequality. These 
two factors have turned, and still turn, the broad and democratic establish-
ment of adequate social welfare institutions into a challenge. The provision 
of these institutions in rural South Africa is an even more complex topic, 
since apartheid-control measures aimed at removing the black population 
from urban centers have favored the formation of isolated rural areas with 
high unemployment rates and precarious housing and education conditions 
(Hirsch 2005).
In order to deal with this legacy of racial discrimination and with 
social imbalances generated by it, the 1996 Constitution committed itself to 
improve the quality of citizens' life, by designating the South Africa Human 
Rights Commission (SAHRC) as the official monitor of public departments 
and state agencies accounting for the application of institutions that asserted 
the socio-economic rights of South African citizens. In 1994, the new gov-
ernment had already committed to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which was one of the biggest treaties 
focused on protecting economic and social rights at that time (Seleoane 2001).
The commitment to the ICESCR has established clauses regarding 
working conditions — sanitary, working environment, equal opportunities, 
fair wages and salaries, limitations on working hours, right to strike, among 
others —, as well as social security, adequate housing and health standards, 
proper education, among others (Seleoane 2001). The South African Consti-
tution aimed at meeting these conditions by including specific sections for 
such institutions, in an attempt to loosen apartheid ties and to enable political 
initiatives to combat poverty and inequality.
15 World Bank data. 
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Work-regulating institutions have been gradually introduced since 
then, and such an introduction has broken patterns that have segregated 
workers from different races and sexes for years. By 1999, most of the main 
institutions responsible for regulating the South African labor market had 
already been established, a fact that strengthened the struggle for labor and 
union rights with a historic record in South Africa (Table 3).
Table 3: Important new labor laws since 1994
Law Main goal Year 
Labor Relations Act Provides the framework for collective bargain-
ing, union right, right to strike, dispute resolu-
tion, among others. 
1995-1996
Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act
Provides the framework for the application of 
minimum standards to workers who are not 
covered by the LRA and of overall minimum 
standards regarding working hours, dismissal 
procedures, overtime and restrictions on child 
labor. 
1997
Employment Equity Act Eliminating race or sex discrimination in large 
firms. 
1998
Skills Development Act 
and Skills Development 
Levies Act
Establishment of spending levels on the train-
ing and qualification of workers by firms.
1998-1999
Source: Elaborated by the author based on data available in Hirsch (2005).   
However, the regulation of the South African labor market took 
place in parallel with the economic restructuring and with unemployment 
increasing from 19.3% to 25.8% (1996-2000) (Barbosa and Tepassê 2009; 
Paola and Pons-Vignon 2013). The hope that a democratic regime with labor 
protection institutions would reduce unemployment did not meet reality, 
which led neoclassical interpretations to point out a supposed "rigidity" in 
the labor market. These institutions, in their turn, demanded greater "flex-
ibility" and ignored the structural roots of unemployment in South Africa, 
the low economic growth of the period and the dominance of sectors linked 
to the mineral-energy complex, which are basically capital-intensive (Paola 
and Pons-Vignon 2013). In addition, labor institutions were inserted in the 
context of a "dualistic economy", where thousands of workers were on the 
margins of the modern and industrial economy, a fact that highlighted the 
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need of implementing state assistance for poverty and inequality matters 
(Hirsch 2005).
Such assistance came in the form of a substantial social security 
system, which transferred income to individuals with disability, provided 
support for children, pensions, among others. In 1997, when the White 
Paper for Social Welfare was launched, the South African government has 
expanded its spending on several social assistance programs, which jumped 
from R$10 billion16 in 1994 to R$38.4 billion, in 2003 (Hirsch 2005). The 
income transfer provided by these institutions was particularly important for 
the black population, which participated with 60% of the income distributed 
in the form of retirements, pensions and social programs in 2005 (Barbosa 
and Tepassê 2009). The total number of social assistance beneficiaries more 
than doubled between 1996 and 2008 and the share of public spending on 
health and education as part of total public spending between 2000 and 2011 
ranged from 10.9% to 12.7%, and from 18.1% to 19.2%, respectively (Barbosa 
and Tepassê 2009; Good Governance Africa 2013).
Conclusion
Based on the debate about the association between institutions and 
economic development, the main aim of this study was to present a criti-
cal view of the mainstream economic discourse propagated by multilateral 
organizations and developed countries. This view credits the successful path 
travelled by advanced economies to a set of "good policies" and "good insti-
tutions", which are mostly market friendly and based on the Anglo-Saxon 
models. The seminal study by South Korean economist Ha-Joon Chang has 
shown, on a historical perspective, that today's developed countries did not 
exactly follow the path they now advocate for the periphery of capitalism. On 
the contrary, they resorted to active policies of state intervention and protec-
tion of national industry, whereas their institutional development was slow 
and often had setbacks (Chang 2004).
The pro-market institutionalist discourse gained strength in the 
developing countries of capitalism in the late 20th century. Thus, it was pos-
sible to see transformations brought about in South Africa since the 1990s 
as the example of a country that was experiencing new institutional change 
processes. The South African democratic transition took place when the 
discussion about the role played by institutions gained importance in the 
16 In rands, the South African official currency. 
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political and economic debate. Multilateral organizations, such as the World 
Bank and the IMF, started interpreting the crises and structural issues of 
developing economies as institutional and governance issues and, in the 
case of African countries, they started equalizing development policies to 
poverty-eradication measures.
Nevertheless, the current study has also addressed how the develop-
ment of a set of institutions — such as democracy, protection of intellectual 
property rights, financial institutions and an independent central bank, tariffs 
and trade liberalization, and the labor market-regulating institutions — since 
the end of the apartheid regime did not necessarily result in better economic 
and social performance. If, on the one hand, it is quite true that "institutions 
matter", on the other hand, it is necessary taking into account that the asso-
ciation between institutions and economic development is more complex 
than what is predicted in the linear "one-size-fits-all" models defended by 
orthodoxy. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown was right when he told The 
Economist that it can take generations to develop reliable institutions. The 
same happened with developed nations, but it is always possible learning 
from history, as well as thinking about institutional programs capable of 
reflecting the structural, political, economic, social and cultural conditions 
of developing countries, without falling into sterile neoliberal models.
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ABSTRACT
The transition to a democratic regime in South Africa in the 1990s met the rise 
of neoliberal policies and the discourse addressing "good institutions" and "good 
governance" as economic growth drivers. In the case of African countries, the dis-
course preached by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF 
included the idea that policies focused on eradicating poverty and on encouraging 
education would also mean development. The aim of the current study is to assess 
to what extent the adequacy to market-oriented institutional models has contributed 
to South African development, based on a set of institutions. In order to do so, the 
current study conducted a literature review about the New Institutional Economics 
(NIE), which is the main proponent of market-oriented institutions as key to devel-
opment; it also analyzed the critical view of these linear models. It concludes that the 
association between institutions and economic development is more complex than 
that estimated in market-oriented models applied to mainstream institutionalism, 
mainly for developing countries.
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